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Abstract
Four studies are reported that employed an object location task to assess temporal–causal reason-
ing. In Experiments 1–3, successfully locating the object required a retrospective consideration of the
order inwhich two events had occurred. InExperiment 1, 5- but not 4-year-oldswere successful; 4-year-
olds also failed to perform at above-chance levels in modiﬁed versions of the task in Experiments 2 and
3. However, in Experiment 4, 3-year-olds were successful when they were able to see the object being
placed ﬁrst in one location and then in the other, rather than having to consider retrospectively the
sequence in which two events had happened. The results suggest that reasoning about the causal signif-
icance of the temporal order of events may not be fully developed before 5 years.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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There are good reasons to believe that by 4 years children are adept at dealing with tem-
poral order information. Children of this age can verbally describe both routine and novel
event sequences in the correct order (see Fivush & Hudson, 1990; Nelson, 1986), and even
much younger children have expectations about the order in which events in a familiar
sequence occur, and can reproduce novel observed sequences of events in the correct order
(Bauer, Wenner, Dropik, & Wewerka, 2000; Carver & Bauer, 2001). In fact, basic forms of
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perception and memory for temporal order have been demonstrated in infants of only a
few months’ age (Lewkowitz, 2004; Mandel, Nelson, & Jusczyk, 1996). Four-year-olds’
judgments about how to complete sequences of pictures representing familiar types of cau-
sal changes also demonstrate that they are sensitive to the order in which the events in the
sequence occur (Das Gupta & Bryant, 1989; Gelman, Bullock, & Meck, 1980), and they
can easily distinguish object transformations that occur in the correct forwards direction
from those that are shown in an anomalous backwards direction (Friedman, 2003a). The
considerable body of research conducted by William Friedman (see Friedman, 2003b, for
review) on young children’s temporal cognition has demonstrated that 4-year-olds can
make judgments about the relative order in which signiﬁcant events (e.g., their birthday
and Christmas) occurred in their past (Friedman, Gardener, & Zubin, 1995; Friedman
& Kemp, 1998), and can also do so for at least some pairs of novel events they have
encountered on a single occasion (Friedman, 1991; though see Friedman & Lyon,
2005). Four-year-olds can also correctly order representations of sequences of familiar
events, such as the main events of a typical day or a visit to the supermarket (Fivush &
Mandler, 1985; Friedman, 1977; Friedman & Brudos, 1988).
All of this evidence suggests that children of this age can encode and remember tempo-
ral order information, and make use of it insofar as they can judge whether event
sequences are correctly or incorrectly ordered. However, it leaves open the extent to which
they can incorporate information about temporal order into further reasoning. It has
recently been suggested that it is not until around 5 years that children can fully under-
stand and thus fully make use of information about the temporal order in which events
have occurred (McCormack & Hoerl, 2005; Povinelli, Landry, Theall, Clark, & Castille,
1999). Speciﬁcally, Povinelli et al. (1999) have suggested that although young children
may indeed possess temporally ordered representations of the world, their reasoning is
constrained because they do not fully grasp the underpinnings of and the signiﬁcance of
such chronological organization. They point out that as mature thinkers we are aware that
the chronological organization of events reﬂects the causal relationships that exist between
diﬀerent events. Povinelli et al.’s suggestion is that an adult-like concept of time involves
not only the ability to represent the temporal order of events, but also an appreciation of
the causal signiﬁcance of that temporal order. In other words, a mature understanding of
time involves grasping that the passage of time leads to the unfolding of ‘‘a successive ser-
ies of causally interdependent states of the world’’ (Povinelli et al., 1999, p. 1427).
The idea that a mature or objective conception of time involves a certain type of causal
understanding is one that has appeared previously in the philosophical literature (notably,
Campbell, 1994; see also Martin, 2001). If this idea is correct, then providing a complete
account of the development of temporal concepts would involve considering not just the
age at which children can make judgments about or reconstruct the temporal order of
events, but evidence that they understand the causal signiﬁcance of temporal order. With-
out such a grasp, errors may occur in inferential reasoning contexts. For example, because
later events in an event sequence may change or obliterate the eﬀects of events that
occurred earlier in the sequence, the overall outcome of a sequence of events often depends
not just on what events have happened but also on the temporal order in which they hap-
pened. As a result, failure to consider the order of occurrence of events in a sequence when
reasoning about the causal consequences of those events can lead to errors. Indeed, Povi-
nelli et al.’s (1999) and McCormack and Hoerl (2005) ﬁndings can be interpreted as evi-
dence that young children are prone to such errors.
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In Povinelli et al.’s (1999) study, children took part in two games, one after another with a
short delay between them. Behind the child’s back and without the child noticing, an exper-
imenter placed a toy in a box behind the child during the playing of Game 1, and thenmoved
it and placed it in another box during the playing of Game 2. Children were subsequently
shown videotapes of themselves playing the games, with the experimenter’s actions now vis-
ible in the background. They were then asked to judge the toy’s current location. The crucial
manipulation in the studywas that the videotapes of the gameswere not necessarily shown in
the order inwhich the games had been played: half of the time children were shownwhere the
experimenter hid the toy during Game 1 and then where it was moved during Game 2, but
half of the time theywere shownﬁrst what happened duringGame 2 and thenwhat happened
during Game 1. That is, the order in which children found out about each hiding event was
decoupled from the order inwhich the hiding events hadoccurred.As a consequence, in Povi-
nelli et al.’s study, children did not just have to remember the order in which the games had
been played, but also had to use this order information to work out where the toy must now
be (i.e., in the location it was placed in during Game 2). It was found that children below
5 years were unable to use the order information in this way, even when cued to consider
it. Povinelli et al. described this failure as due to a lack of understanding of the causal signif-
icance of the temporal order in which the events took place.
McCormack and Hoerl (2005) used a quite diﬀerent task, but obtained similar results.
In their task, children were initially introduced to two dolls, Sally and Katy, who always
performed actions in a certain order: they learned that Sally always went ﬁrst, and then
Katy always went next. Children were then shown a novel piece of apparatus—a large yel-
low box with two diﬀerently colored buttons—and learned how it worked. Pressing one of
the buttons caused a toy car to drop down one chute and appear on a shelf in a transpar-
ent window, whereas pressing the other button caused a marble to drop down another
chute and appear on the shelf. The window only ever contained one toy at a time, as
the box was mechanically constructed such that whatever toy was already in the window
dropped out of sight into a drawer below before a new toy appeared. Children had to learn
which button yielded which toy. At test, a screen was then put in front of the box and, out
of view of the child, Sally and Katy pressed one button each. The nature of the box was
such that which object was left in the window after these button-presses depended on the
order in which the buttons were pressed. Finally, the box was uncovered again.
In one version of the task, after the screen was removed, children could see each doll
standing next to the button that she had pressed, but the window in the box was left
occluded. In this version, children had to infer which toy was inside the window. In other
words, given information from which they could determine the order in which two earlier
events had occurred (the pressing of the buttons by the dolls), children had to infer the
current state of the world (the object in the window). Four-year-olds consistently failed
this task, whereas 5-year-olds passed, at least when cued to attend to the order informa-
tion. McCormack and Hoerl (2005) described their task as assessing temporal-causal rea-
soning, which they deﬁned as reasoning in which ‘‘the causal implications of the temporal
order of two or more events must be considered in one’s reasoning’’ (p. 55). In both their
task and that of Povinelli et al., inferences about the current state of the world will only be
correct if the order in which the two relevant events have occurred is considered; thus both
tasks can be described as temporal–causal-reasoning tasks.
The issue addressed in the current study is whether the paradigms used by Povinelli et al.
(1999) andMcCormack andHoerl (2005) have led to an underestimation of young children’s
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abilities. Importantly, Povinelli et al.’s task required children to understand something about
the representational medium of videotape—in particular that video clips of events that are
novel to them in fact depict real events that occurred in the recent past, and that the order
inwhich two events are presented on video is not necessarily determined by the order inwhich
those events actually happened. Although Povinelli et al. attempted to ensure that children
understood the nature of video, it seems sensible to assess whether children still have diﬃcul-
ties with temporal-causal reasoning when the task does not involve this representational
medium, aspects of whose functioning they may still be unfamiliar with.
McCormack and Hoerl’s (2005) task was an attempt at such an assessment. Although
their ﬁndings closely resembled those of Povinelli et al. (1999) using a quite diﬀerent task,
it is still necessary to consider the additional demands that their task may have placed on
young children. Arguably, the novelty of their apparatus, and the demands the task placed
on working/long-term memory may have led to an underestimation of 4-year-olds’ abili-
ties. In the task, children ﬁrst had to learn which button press gave which object. At test
they then had to retrieve this information and put it together with information about the
order in which the buttons had been pressed by the dolls, which in itself involved retrieving
information about the order in which the dolls always acted. Retrieving these pieces of
information and then combining them may have proved beyond the working memory
capabilities of young children. Indeed, McCormack and Hoerl (2005) distinguished
between two quite diﬀerent explanations of 4-year-olds’ failure: that children of this age
genuinely do not seem to grasp the signiﬁcance of temporal order information, or that
the processing demands of the task (in particular, the working-memory demands) are
beyond their capabilities. They admitted that their ﬁndings alone did not allow them to
decide between these two possibilities.
Thus, the aim of the present study was to examine 4-year-olds’ abilities using a task that
had aminimal working-memory load. It was also important to use a task that did not require
competence with a potentially unfamiliar representational medium such as videotape, as
required byPovinelli et al.’s (1999) study.As inMcCormack andHoerl’s (2005) task, the task
involved two dolls that always acted in a particular order. However, there were a number of
key diﬀerences between their task and the one used in the present study. First, and most
importantly, the consequences of the two dolls’ actions were essentially given to children
in the display at test. This contrasts with McCormack and Hoerl’s task, which required
retrieval of novel pairings from long-term memory that had to be learned in a pre-test train-
ing session. In the present study, children simply needed to combine the information that was
clearly given to them in the test display with information about the order in which the dolls
had acted. Second, control questions were always asked immediately before the test question
that would have acted as a cue to retrieve such order information. These control questions
ensured that children had in mind the order the dolls carried out the relevant actions just
before they had to answer the test question. Both of these procedural adjustments ensured
that the memory demands of the task were kept to a minimum.
There were three additional diﬀerences. Unlike in McCormack and Hoerl’s (2005) task,
the task did not involve a completely novel piece of mechanical apparatus; rather the rel-
evant events took place in a prototypical doll’s house. Furthermore, the dolls’ actions were
set in the context of a simple narrative to engage children’s attention, whereas there was no
such narrative underpinning the events in McCormack and Hoerl’s task. The last diﬀer-
ence concerns the events that necessarily took place out of sight of the child during the
procedure. In both McCormack and Hoerl’s and Povinelli et al.’s (1999) task, there was
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no rationale provided to children for why the crucial events had occurred out of sight of
the child. Thus, young children may not have felt conﬁdent that there was a correct answer
that could be logically inferred from the evidence (e.g., because they may have assumed
that trickery had been carried out). In the present study, the fact that the dolls’ actions
took place out of sight made sense within the task context. Finally, although the task dif-
fered from those used in previous studies in the ways that have been outlined, it was in one
important respect similar: children encountered just a single example of the relevant event
sequence. This was to ensure that their answers were based on reasoning about event order
information, rather than based on accrued knowledge about the typical outcomes of par-
ticular sequences. We return to this issue in the General Discussion.
The ﬁndings from Povinelli et al.’s (1999) andMcCormack andHoerl’s (2005) studies are
striking because the pre-existing research literature might lead one to predict that 3- or 4-
year-olds should pass such a task. As we have pointed out, there is considerable evidence
to suggest that even very young children are competent at representing and remembering
temporal order information (reviewed in Friedman, 2003b). Furthermore, their competence
in a number of domains involving temporal and/or causal cognition has been well-demon-
strated: existing research suggests that 3- or 4-year-olds have some planning abilities (e.g.,
Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Hudson, Sosa, & Shapiro, 1997), can make at least some simple
future hypothetical and counterfactual judgments (e.g., Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apper-
ly, 2006), can use temporally-structured scripts to guide their behavior (Nelson, 1986, 1996),
and seem to systematically base their judgments of the causal powers of objects on patterns of
evidence (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2004). Arguably, this body of research might lead us to predict
that 4-year-olds should be successfully on the simpliﬁed task used in the present study.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Fifty-six children took part in the study, 29 4-year-olds (M = 53 months; Range = 48–
57 months; 16 boys and 13 girls) and 27 5-year-olds (M = 65 months; Range = 61–
71 months; 9 boys and 18 girls). Children were recruited from nurseries and schools local
to the university of the ﬁrst author. They were tested individually in a quiet corner of their
schools or nurseries, and each child received a sticker of his or her choice for taking part.
Materials
A purpose-built two-storey wooden dolls’ house 55 cm wide, 38 cm tall, and 14 cm depth
was used. There were four equally-sized rooms in the house (kitchen, living room, bedroom,
and bathroom), with each room containing wooden furniture appropriate to the function of
the room. In the bathroom there were two colored cupboards, each 12 cm tall, 5 cmwide and
3 cm in depth, one blue and one red. Therewas also oneminiature toy hairbrush 2.5 cm long.
The house was constructed with gaps in the front and back walls of each room; this allowed
both the experimenter and the child to see into the rooms, with the experimenter seated
behind the house facing the child, who sat in front of the house. There was a sliding door
attached to the bathroom that the experimenter could close fully, preventing the child but
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not the experimenter from seeing into the room. Two wooden clothed dolls were used in the
study, with diﬀerent heights (11 and 9 cm), hair color, and clothing. At the test phase, two
life-size laminated photographs of the bathroom cupboards were used.
Procedure
Children were shown the dolls’ house and their attention was drawn to the bathroom.
They were then shown the two photographs of the cupboards and asked to point to the
cupboard in the house shown in each picture. No child had diﬃculty with this. Children
were then introduced to the two doll characters, John and Peter, and told that they had
been playing in the garden and had got a bit messy, and that they were now going into
the house. They were told that the dolls were going to wash their hands in the kitchen sink,
and as they did so the experimenter drew the child’s attention to the order in which the
dolls acted, and told the child that the dolls always acted in this order. The dolls then car-
ried out two further activities (playing with a toy train in the living room and going on the
rocking horse in the bedroom). The experimenter provided a similar narration to each
activity that was similar to that used in the kitchen and emphasized the order in which
the dolls always acted. The children were then told that the dolls were going to go into
the bathroom to brush their hair which had got messy when they were playing outside.
The hairbrush, which was sitting by the bathroom sink, was pointed out to them, as were
the two cupboards. When the two dolls went into the bathroom, the experimenter closed
the door. The house was constructed so that the experimenter still had access to the room
while the door was closed, and the experimenter said ‘‘You can’t see John right now, but
he goes ﬁrst and gets the hairbrush and now he is brushing his hair. Now he puts the hair-
brush in one of the cupboards. Peter goes last. You can’t see him now, but he gets the hair-
brush out and now he is brushing his hair. Now he puts the hairbrush into the other
cupboard,’’ with the cupboard that each doll put the hairbrush in counterbalanced across
trials. After this, the door to the room was opened and the dolls emerged with tidy hair.
The test phase immediately followed the emergence of the dolls from the bathroom,
with dolls placed side-by-side in front of the child. Children were initially asked two con-
trol questions about the order of the dolls’ actions, in counterbalanced order: ‘‘Can you
remember which doll brushed his hair ﬁrst?’’ and ‘‘Can you remember which doll brushed
his hair last?’’. All children answered these questions correctly. The experimenter then
reminded the child that the hairbrush was inside one of the cupboards, and said that
she was going to put each doll beside a picture of the cupboard that he had put the hair-
brush into. The photographs were placed beside the dolls, initially face-down, with left–
right location of the cupboard that contained the hairbrush counterbalanced across trials.
The experimenter turned over both photographs simultaneously, and then asked the child:
‘‘So, where do you think the brush is right now?’’, with either a verbal or a pointing
response deemed acceptable. Regardless of whether or not the child was correct, the exper-
imenter then thanked the child for playing the game well, and the child was given a sticker.
Results and discussion
Table 1 shows the proportion of children who selected the correct cupboard. The major-
ity of children in each age-group selected the correct cupboard as the hairbrush’s current
location. However, although the 5-year-olds did choose the correct location signiﬁcantly
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more frequently than would have been expected by chance (binomial test, p < .05), as a
group the 4-year-olds did not perform signiﬁcantly above chance (binomial test, p > .05).
These ﬁndings are compatible with those of McCormack and Hoerl (2005), in that 5-
but not 4-year-olds were able to use information about the order in which two events
had happened to make a correct inference about a current state of the world. Unlike in
McCormack and Hoerl’s task, children did not have to retrieve information from long-
term memory about the impact of each doll’s action. The impact that each doll’s action
had in this task was on the location of the hairbrush, and the location of this object fol-
lowing each doll’s action was directly given to participants in the photographs placed in
front of them. These photographs were present while the test question was being asked.
The fact that children did not have to retrieve such information from long-term memory
to combine it with information about the order in which the dolls had acted makes it dif-
ﬁcult to explain 4-year-olds’ failure of the task in terms of a working memory problem.
Passing the task depended crucially on remembering and using information about the
order in which the dolls had acted. It would seem diﬃcult to explain 4-year-olds’ perfor-
mance in termsof a failure to remember such information, since all children answered control
questions assessing this knowledge immediately before the test question was administered.
Both Povinelli et al. (1999) and McCormack and Hoerl (2005) tried to boost younger chil-
dren’s performance by explicitly drawing their attention to the order of the relevant events
(albeit without success). Asking children the control questions immediately before the test
question should have served to draw their attention to event order. However, in Experiment
2, we aimed tomake the event order evenmore salient by actually letting children see that the
dolls acted in a particular order. In this version of the task, children observed the dolls car-
rying out the relevant actions one at a time, but could not actually infer the outcome of their
actions before the crucial information was provided at test. This allowed children to directly
encode the order in which the dolls had acted, and this alteration, it was hoped, should have
made the order of the doll’s actions more salient to them.
Experiment 2
Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight 4-year-olds (M = 55 months; Range = 50–59 months; 12 boys and 16
girls) took part in the study, none of whom had taken part in Experiment 1. They were
recruited and tested in a manner identical to that of Experiment 1.
Table 1
Percentage of children who passed the tasks in Experiments 1–3
Correct %
Experiment 1 4-year-olds (N = 29) 62
5-year-olds (N = 27) 81*
Experiment 2 4-year-olds (N = 28) 54
Experiment 3 4-year-olds (N = 26) 50
* p < .05.
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Materials
These were the same materials as were used in Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1, with a single alteration:
rather than the dolls both going into the bathroom at the same time, they went in one
at a time. At the appropriate point in the procedure, the experimenter explained to chil-
dren, as in Experiment 1, that the dolls were going to go into the bathroom to brush their
hair. Then the ﬁrst doll (John) went into the bathroom on his own, and the door was
closed behind him. His unseen actions were described to the child as before (i.e., ‘‘Now
he is brushing his hair. Now he puts the hairbrush in one of the cupboards. . .’’), and on
completing these actions, the door was opened and the doll emerged with tidy hair. When
the door was opened, children could not see where the hairbrush was, as it was at that
point already inside one of the cupboards. Following John’s emergence, Peter went into
the bathroom and the same procedure was repeated. The test phase began immediately
after Peter emerged from the bathroom, and was identical to that used in Experiment 1.
Results and discussion
As can be seen from Table 1, this alteration in procedure did not improve perfor-
mance. Children’s performance did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from chance levels (bino-
mial test, p > .05). Thus, although the order in which the dolls acted was actually
visible to children as the procedure was conducted, and thus could easily be encoded
by them, 4-year-olds were nevertheless unable to use such information to answer the
test question.
These results suggest that 4-year-olds’ diﬃculties really do lie with realizing the signif-
icance of the order information that is available to them and using it to answer the test
question. However, we wished to rule out the possibility that children’s diﬃculties lie with
the use of photographs of the object’s location during the test phase. We initially decided
to use photographs because they provided a way of informing children which cupboard
each doll had placed the hairbrush in simultaneously for both dolls. Informing them of
this verbally would have necessitated providing the information in a certain order (i.e.,
ﬁrst about the location in which one doll had placed the hairbrush and then about the
location in which the other doll had placed it), which would have raised the possibility
of children simply updating their representation of the hairbrush’s location sequentially
as they found out each piece of information. This would have led to the wrong answer
if the order in which they were told about each location visit diﬀered from the order in
which the visits had occurred. Although the use of photographs, which could be revealed
simultaneously, ruled out this possibility, perhaps children in some way had diﬃculty
understanding the signiﬁcance of the photographs.
In our pre-test check, we ensured all children could match the photographs to the actual
cupboards, and indeed previous research would indicate that 4-year-olds should have no
diﬃculties with understanding the correspondences between photographs and real objects
(see Liben, 2003). Nevertheless, given that we wish to argue that 4-year-olds’ problems are
with making the appropriate inference, it is important to rule out all explanations of their
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failure that are theoretically uninteresting. Thus, in the third experiment, rather than using
photographs, each doll was placed immediately adjacent to the cupboard that he had put
the hairbrush in. If children’s diﬃculties on the previous tasks were with the photographs,
they would be expected to be successful on this task.
Experiment 3
Methods
Participants
Twenty-six 4-year-olds (M = 51 months, Range = 48–54 months; 13 girls and 13 boys)
completed the task, none of whom had taken part in the ﬁrst two experiments. They were
recruited and tested in a manner identical to that of Experiment 1.
Materials
These were identical to those used in the ﬁrst two experiments, except that the photo-
graphs were not used.
Procedure
The task followed the procedure used in Experiment 1, up until the point at which
the bathroom door was opened after the dolls had brushed their hair. In this experi-
ment, the door was opened to reveal each of the dolls standing beside one of the cup-
boards (the speciﬁc cupboard that each doll stood beside was counterbalanced).
Participants were then told that each doll was standing beside the cupboard that he
had placed the hairbrush in, and then were asked the two control questions, followed
by the test question.
Results and discussion
As can be seen in Table 1, children performed on this task at chance levels, with exactly
half of the group choosing each location. This result rules out an explanation of 4-year-
olds’ failure on the ﬁrst two experiments in terms of their diﬃculties using the photographs
as depictions of the locations in which the hairbrush had been placed. It provides further
support for the hypothesis that children of this age have genuine diﬃculties making use of
temporal order information.
Experiment 4
In our last experiment, we wished to rule out any possibility that there is something
about the test procedure itself which may distract or confuse children. Perhaps asking
the child the two control questions rather than acting as a cue to consider temporal order
information may somehow have confused them and led to diﬃculties focusing on the test
question. The version of the task used in Experiment 4 followed the procedure used in
Experiment 1, except that we actually allowed children to see the hairbrush being placed
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in each cupboard. The test phase then proceeded as in Experiment 1. Our rationale here
was that if there was something about the procedure during the test phase that was dis-
tracting or confusing, we might expect children to make errors even though they had actu-
ally seen the hairbrush being placed ﬁrst in one cupboard and then in the next. In other
words, even though in this version of the task children could provide a correct answer sim-
ply through sequentially updating their representation of the hairbrush’s location, if the
procedure used at test is itself problematic we might expect to see poor performance.
On the other hand, if children’s problems are with making the appropriate inference,
we would expect high levels of performance when the correct answer can be given by sim-
ply remembering where the hairbrush was last placed.
In this experiment, younger children (3-year-olds) were tested. This was because we
wished to assess whether the ﬁndings from the present task would provide further evidence
for the distinction between temporal-causal reasoning and the much more developmen-
tally primitive temporal updating (McCormack & Hoerl, 2005). In temporal updating,
children simply change their model of the world (e.g., where certain objects are located)
when they receive information about changes in the world. Children may sequentially
update a model in response to observing or inferring such changes, or perhaps due to being
told about them. Crucially, children’s models change over time simply as a result of them
receiving information about diﬀerent events in a certain order, rather than children them-
selves reasoning about the order in which those events happened. The altered version of
the task used in Experiment 4 could be passed by simple updating since children actually
viewed the hairbrush being placed in ﬁrst one cupboard and then another, whereas this
was not the case in the previous experiments. Given that McCormack and Hoerl (2005)
argued that temporal updating is developmentally primitive, we might expect even 3-
year-olds to ﬁnd the task trivially easy, despite 4-year-olds’ consistent diﬃculties on the
task in Experiments 1–3.
Methods
Participants
Seventeen 3-year-olds (M = 42 months; Range = 34–47 months; 6 boys and 11 girls)
took part in the experiment. These were recruited through a nursery school local to the
ﬁrst author’s university. They were tested in their nursery, and received stickers for taking
part in the task.
Materials
These were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Procedure
This was identical to that used in Experiment 1 with a single modiﬁcation: the bath-
room door was left open at all times during the task. Small alterations were made to
the experimenter’s narration to make it compatible with this changed procedure (e.g.,
the experimenter did not say ‘‘You can’t see X right now, but. . .’’). The test phase was
identical to that used in Experiment 1.
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Results and discussion
All of the children except one chose the correct location; thus performance was signif-
icantly above chance on this task (binomial test, p < .05). This result suggests that when
the task can be passed simply by observing and remembering the consequences of the
dolls’ actions, it is trivially easy even for 3-year-olds. This ﬁnding indicates that 4-year-
olds’ problems on the task seem to be with making the relevant temporal–causal inference,
and that the procedure at test (e.g., asking the two control questions before the test ques-
tion) itself does not unnecessarily confuse or distract children.
General discussion
The ﬁndings of Experiments 1–3 are entirely consistent with those of McCormack and
Hoerl (2005) and Povinelli et al. (1999), in that 4-year-olds had diﬃculties using informa-
tion about the order in which two events had occurred to reach a conclusion about the
current state of the world. This ability has been labeled temporal–causal reasoning, since
it requires a grasp of the causal signiﬁcance of temporal order information. Four-year-olds
had diﬃculties even though they correctly answered control questions about the order in
which the dolls had acted that were asked immediately before test—questions which might
have been expected to cue children to the importance of considering the temporal order of
the dolls’ actions. Furthermore, allowing children to actually observe the order in which
the dolls acted (but not their actions; Experiment 2), did not improve performance. Exper-
iments 1 and 2 required that children grasp the correspondence between life-size photo-
graphs depicting two cupboards and the two cupboards in the dolls’ house, one of
which they had to choose as the location of the target object. Although there was no rea-
son to believe that children had diﬃculty with this, Experiment 3 used a version of the task
in which photographs were not used, with the dolls simply placed beside the locations that
each had placed the object in. This did not improve performance, suggesting that the task
taps the ability to make a basic type of inference that young children have diﬃculty with.
In Experiment 4, an identical procedure was used, except that children were actually
able to see the relevant actions of the dolls. This allowed children to simply sequentially
update their representation of the object’s location as they saw it being moved. Under such
circumstances, the task proved easy even for 3-year-olds. This suggests that 4-year-olds’
diﬃculties lie with making a retrospective inference about events which they did not
observe at the time of occurrence. The ﬁnding provides further support for the distinction
between temporal–causal reasoning and a much more developmentally primitive ability,
temporal updating (McCormack & Hoerl, 2005). Performance in Experiment 4 could have
been based on such updating, and indeed even 3-year-olds had no diﬃculties in such a
task. The key diﬀerence between the task in Experiment 4 and the tasks in the other exper-
iments was that it did not actually require the child to consider the order in which the
events had happened in reaching a conclusion: it was suﬃcient just to retrieve a represen-
tation of the hairbrush’s location that had been appropriately updated on observing its
previous movements. Thus, the task in Experiment 4 did not require temporal–causal rea-
soning as we have described it.
We now turn to considering how our research ﬁndings relate to those of studies exam-
ining other aspects of temporal and causal cognition. Historically, much research on the
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development of causal cognition has focused on children’s ability to select, among a num-
ber of candidates, the cause of a given eﬀect, and on the principles according to which they
do so (e.g., Shultz, 1982; Shultz & Kestenbaum, 1985; Siegler, 1975; see White, 1995 for
review). Thus, one very wide-spread type of task in this context involves presenting chil-
dren with an outcome O that happens in the presence of two objects (or other events),
A and B, and the task is for children to judge whether it is A or B (or both) that causes
O (e.g., Bullock, Gellman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Schlottmann, 1999; Shultz & Mendelson,
1975; for a recent variation on this line of research see Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour,
2001; Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004). Research using this type of task might broadly
be described as investigating the bases on which children judge that a particular object or
event has the causal power to produce a certain eﬀect, whereas another object or event
lacks that causal power (either because of the type of object or event it is, or because it
does not stand in the right sort of relationship with the eﬀect). We will call this type of
reasoning causal powers reasoning (the term ‘causal power’ is used loosely here without
implying any commitment to any particular theory of causal learning or knowledge).
Much of the debate over the nature and development of causal reasoning has been con-
cerned with establishing the principles and underlying mechanisms that guide causal pow-
ers reasoning (Corrigan & Denton, 1996; Gopnik et al., 2004; White, 1995).
As we have said, in typical causal reasoning tasks, participants are provided with some
sort of evidence that allows them to infer the causal powers of an object or event. Imagine,
for example, a task in which children are provided with types of evidence that would allow
them to infer that event A has the causal power to produce an outcome O1 and that event
B has the causal power to produce an outcome O2. The research evidence mentioned
above would suggest that 4-year-olds should be able under many circumstances to use
the evidence that they are provided with in principled ways to infer the causal powers
of events A or B (i.e., that they produce O1 and O2, respectively). However, to pass
our temporal–causal-reasoning task, it is not enough simply to be aware of the causal
powers of the relevant individual events. In our task, there are two events A (the putting
of the hairbrush in the blue cupboard) and B (the putting of the hairbrush in the red cup-
board) and children have to deduce the ﬁnal outcome of the event sequence—we will call
this the FO (The nature of the task is such that in fact the FO will either be O1 or O2.).
However, knowing the outcomes of each of the individual events A and B, while trivially
easy to infer in our task (e.g., putting the hairbrush in the red cupboard results in the out-
come of it being in the red cupboard), is clearly not suﬃcient to judge the FO correctly.
Success on this task depends on bringing to bear an additional awareness that one ﬁnal
outcome, FO1, will obtain if the event sequence was A then B and a diﬀerent ﬁnal out-
come, FO2, will obtain if the event sequence was B then A. This is what seems to cause
4-year-olds problems, either because they lack the realization that this is the case, or
because they fail to use such a realization to guide their reasoning.
Thus, we are making a distinction between conventional causal reasoning tasks that
involve making judgments about the causal powers of individual events (i.e., being able
to judge the outcomes that they have resulted/result in), and being able to reason about
the causal signiﬁcance of the order in which a series of such events occurred (i.e., being
able to judge the ﬁnal outcome that obtains/has obtained after a sequence of these
events). Clearly, being able to judge FOs depends upon prior knowledge of individual
event outcomes in the event series. That is, it would be impossible to judge the FO if
the individual outcomes O1 and O2 for A and B were not known. In fact, a key advan-
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tage of our task over that previously used by McCormack and Hoerl (2005) is that in
the present task the individual outcomes O1 and O2 of each event A and B are straight-
forward and do not require pre-training children. In contrast, in McCormack and
Hoerl’s (2005) study children had to actually take part in a pre-training session in which
they learned the novel outcomes O1 and O2 that resulted from A and B (speciﬁcally, the
diﬀerent outcomes that resulted from pressing two buttons on a novel piece of
apparatus).
As we have said, knowledge of or an ability to deduce individual outcomes (the causal
powers of events) is not suﬃcient to pass temporal–causal-reasoning tasks. Not only are
we are making a distinction between two sorts of abilities, we are suggesting that one
may emerge later in development than another. However, what might be thought to com-
plicate the picture here is that some of the studies that have assessed children’s ability to
infer the causal powers of individual events have looked at whether 4-year-olds can use
evidence that is speciﬁcally temporal in nature. Two types of temporal evidence have been
examined. First, research on the temporal priority principle has demonstrated that 4-year-
olds’ causal judgments usually respect the principle that causes must be temporally prior to
eﬀects (Bullock & Gelman, 1979; Bullock et al., 1982). Second, research has examined
whether temporal contiguity has an impact on children’s causal judgments. Typically,
the issue is: if one of the candidate causes happens some time before an outcome, but
the other candidate is temporally contiguous with the outcome, do children have a ten-
dency to judge that the latter candidate is the cause of the outcome? A number of studies
have found that children do indeed often choose the temporally contiguous event as the
one which had the causal power to produce outcome (Schlottmann, 1999; Siegler & Lie-
bert, 1975; though see Shultz, 1982).
Does the fact that 4-year-olds’ causal powers judgments often respect such temporally-
speciﬁed principles mean that in fact they are capable of temporal–causal reasoning as we
have described it? We would argue children may be able to exploit such temporal informa-
tion in choosing which of two candidates A and B caused a particular outcome without
having to consider explicitly the temporal relationship between those two candidate
causes. In tasks examining use of the temporal priority principle, typically an initial event
A occurs, followed by an outcome O, and then a subsequent event B. Use of the principle
is demonstrated by a choice of A over B as a cause of O. Potentially, children could choose
correctly simply by operating with a default along the lines of: once O has happened, no
longer consider any further potential causes. Use of such a default would not actually even
involve a consideration of the relative order of A and B. Similarly, use of temporal con-
tiguity as a cue is typically demonstrated in a situation in which an event A happens, fol-
lowed by a delay, and then event B followed immediately by the eﬀect O. Again, children
might choose B because of a strong (albeit potentially illusionary; see Schlottmann, 1999)
perceptual eﬀect that leads them to disregard A as a potential cause. Temporal contiguity
eﬀects are observed in many animals and at their most basic may be a reﬂection of the fun-
damental properties of associative learning mechanisms or systems involved in the storage
of perceptual information (White, 1988). Operating with such defaults and heuristics
would lead to correct responses without the child actually considering the relative tempo-
ral orders of A, B, and O.
It remains to be established if this characterization of the processing underlying 4-year-
olds’ respect for temporal factors in their judgments of the causal powers of individual
events is correct. However, their high levels of success on such tasks is in marked contrast
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to their poor performance on the tasks used here and in other studies, indicating that the
latter tasks do tap a more demanding reasoning ability.
We now turn to brieﬂy considering the ways in which our ﬁndings and task analyses
relate to research assessing some other important types of cognition that may also be
thought to have a temporal component: planning and script use. Some planning tasks
(most notably those used by Atance & O’Neill, 2001) require children as young as three
to consider a future situation in which their desire diﬀers from their current desire, in line
with Tulving’s (2004) requirements for a ‘‘true’’ planning task. However, such tasks do not
require children to consider the temporal order of a future event sequence, but to consider
a single future event (i.e., they are ‘‘one step’’ planning tasks). Tasks such as Atance’s trip
task simply require that the children know that in order to achieve a certain outcome, they
will need to have with them an object with certain causal powers. As such they do not
require children to reason about FOs (ﬁnal outcomes) of an event sequence. In contrast,
some other planning tasks do explicitly require children to consider the temporal order in
which individual events need to happen to achieve a certain FO (most notably, versions of
the Tower of Hanoi/London task; Klahr & Robinson, 1981; Levin et al., 1991; Luciana &
Nelson, 1998; Welsh, 1991; Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991); consistent with our
ﬁndings, performance on such tasks improves greatly between 3 and 5 years.
Second, research on children’s memory for familiar event sequences has amply demon-
strated their ability to represent and remember temporal order information (Nelson, 1986;
Fivush & Hudson, 1990; reviewed in Nelson, 1996). It might be argued that the ability to
exploit a script-like representation of a familiar event sequence requires exactly the sort of
temporal–causal reasoning abilities that we have been talking about. Consider an example
of a familiar event sequence in which the FO is having the shopping done, where A is
selecting goods, and B is paying at the check-out. For the FO to obtain A needs to happen
before B. Research on children’s use of scripts demonstrates that children can learn the
order in which events need to happen in order for FOs such as these to obtain and apply
such knowledge appropriately to guide their behavior and expectations. Does this consti-
tute evidence that children can reason about the causal signiﬁcance of temporal order
information? It is important to note that we are not arguing that children cannot learn
through experience or observation that the FO of an event sequence AB can be diﬀerent
from the FO of an event sequence BA. That is why our task involves only a single trial,
since we acknowledge that given a number of exposures with feedback, such learning
could take place. However, exploiting such learning is a matter more akin to recognition
than reasoning: it simply involves children recognizing that this is a circumstance in which,
for example, FO1 will obtain, rather than insightfully using order information to make a
deduction.
In general, what we are suggesting, along with Povinelli et al. (1999), is that children’s
problems with tasks like the ones used in this study may reﬂect a failure to fully grasp or
utilize in their reasoning the nature of the relationships between events in time. We have
argued that these ﬁndings are consistent with demonstrations of 4-year-olds’ competence
on tasks involving other sorts of temporal and causal cognition (causal powers reasoning,
planning, and script use). The idea that there is a fundamental change between 3 and
5 years in children’s temporal cognition is not a new one. In particular, there have been
attempts to link changes in children’s emerging competence with temporal relational terms
with underlying cognitive changes (Cromer, 1971; Weist, 1986, 1989; Weist, Lyytinen,
Wysocka, & Atanassova, 1997; see Friedman, 1978). The studies described here provide
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additional evidence that 4-year-olds have diﬃculty with what has been termed temporal–
causal reasoning. They also provide further support for the basic distinction between this
type of reasoning and more primitive temporal updating abilities. We have suggested,
along with Povinelli et al. (1999), that this may reﬂect a failure to exploit in their reasoning
that the temporal order of events has causal signiﬁcance.
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